Blog post by Tahseen Shams, University of Pennsylvania, USA

​In my research, I ask how do Black and White Canadians perceive South Asian Muslims – the largest Muslim ethnic group in Canada – as romantic partners? Based on interviews of 46 Black and White Canadians from diverse socioeconomic background in Toronto, my Identities article, ‘Religification of brownness and racialization of Muslimness: how do Black and White Canadians perceive South Asian Muslims as romantic partners?’, shows that Islamophobic tropes as civilizationally backward, patriarchal and intolerant of religious freedom and sexual minorities deter many Black and White Canadians who are not Muslim to even consider dating someone from an Islamic background.
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These Islamophobic stereotypes are so widespread in Canadian society that even the participants who are generally open to being in interracial unions with South Asians do not want to be in relationships with Muslim South Asians. Even when their experiences with Muslim partners were positive, they did not want to risk entering another relationship with a Muslim. They feared that their Muslim partners and their families would force them to convert to Islam. Both Black and White women worried that they will be forced to wear a hijab, give up their careers and be subservient to their husbands. 

Blog post by Wajihah Hamid, Macquarie University, Australia
 
Every year, Eid al-Adha is often introduced to the wider public as the Muslim ‘festival of sacrifice’. This description is not wrong, but it is too thin. It tells us what the day commemorates, but not what the day does: how it gathers families, moves food across households, renews bonds of obligation, and makes Islam visible not as an abstraction, but as a lived and ordinary practice.

Eid al-Adha marks the story of Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), his family, and their willingness to submit to God. It is closely tied to Hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Makkah, and to the memory of sacrifice, trust and obedience. For Muslims who are able to do so, Eid al-Adha is also marked by qurban or udhiyah, the ritual sacrifice of an animal. The meat is then distributed among family, neighbours and those in need. The Qur’an (22:37) teaches that it is not the meat or blood that reaches God, but piety and sincerity. This matters because qurban is not simply an act of ritual slaughter. It is an ethical practice of sharing.

On Eid morning, millions of Muslims around the world attend congregational prayers at local mosques, open fields, community halls and temporary prayer spaces. The morning is filled with takbir, greetings, embraces, visits to elders, gifts for children, food prepared in advance, and messages sent across families separated by migration and distance. The day before Eid, the Day of Arafah, is also widely understood by Muslims as a special time for supplication and nearness to God. A well-known hadith describes the best supplication as the supplication of the Day of Arafah. Eid al-Adha therefore sits within a larger sacred time: prayer, remembrance, charity, food and community.

Blog post by Jihane Sliti and Iman Lechkar, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

With the rapidly deteriorating security situation in North East Syria, media discourse once again presents the issue of Kurdish-led camps and its prisoners as a security threat. As the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) lose control over detention camps, such as Al Hol, reports of mass escapes of Islamic State members dominate the news. In Belgium, this renewed sense of urgency was reinforced when Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel Prevot stated on 22 January 2026 that ‘terrorist fighters will not be able to return to Belgium’.

Fear-driven discourses are not new. For more than a decade, public and political debates on Belgian men who travelled to Syria have largely been shaped by punitive logics and vindictiveness. Yet our research shows that ‘foreign fighters’ have not always been framed as irredeemable threats. Media discourse has, at times, allowed for complexity and empathy, though not for everyone.

Based on a critical media discourse analysis, our research published in our Identities article, ‘On altar boys and good-hearted guys: de-Othering and the whitening of male convert “foreign fighters” in Belgian newspapers’, shows that the category of ‘foreign fighters’ was not always associated with danger. While born Muslim Belgian men who left for Syria were frequently depicted as barbaric and irredeemable, converts were mostly presented as naïve and disillusioned individuals who had made poor choices. Indeed, scholarly literature discerns two main depictions of convert men as naïve, disillusioned and redeemable, or as traitors, radical and in high-ranking positions. 

Blog post by Çağlar Çetin-Ayşe, Augustana College, USA
 
When discussions of gender equality surface in Turkey, attention often centers on women’s struggles and resistance. My research, published in Identities as ‘Unpacking the nexus of ethnoreligious identity, minority status, and young men’s feminist self-identification in Turkey’, shifts that focus to diverse young men who support gender equality. Based on face-to-face interviews I conducted with Sunni Turkish, Kurdish, Alevi and Arab Alawite men, the study examines how their ethnoreligious identities shape their paths toward (or away from) feminist allyship. The findings complicate the widespread assumption that marginalization fosters empathy for other oppressed groups.

Across Europe and beyond, public debates may frame minority men (such as Muslim men in Scandinavian countries or Kurdish men in Turkey) as either threats to gender equality or as potential allies due to their experiences of exclusion. But the picture is far more complex. In Turkey, a country deeply polarized along ethnic, religious and political lines, these dynamics play out in unexpected ways.

Blog post by Övgü Ülgen, University of Montreal, Canada
 
Identities are multiple, fragmented, fluid, and – generationally speaking – often quite complex. My Identities article, ‘Generations and difference: language, religion, and North African Jewish identification in Québec’, examines the generational dynamics of North African Jewish belonging in this francophone province through the interplay of language and religion.
 
Drawing on 18 life-story interviews with North African Jewish immigrants in Québec, my article examines the coexistence of non-convergent identities across generations. Participants included first-generation immigrants, primarily baby boomers (born 1946–1964) with a few from the silent generation (born 1937–1945); 1.5-generation individuals from Generation X (born 1965–1979) who immigrated before the age of 18; and second-generation participants born and raised in Québec, including both Generation Xers and millennials (born 1980–mid-1990s). The first wave of North African Jewish immigrants to Québec – mostly francophone – settled in the 1950s, though emigration, particularly from Morocco, continued over the following decades. 

Blog post by Ester Gallo, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
 
My Identities article, ‘Utility workers: religion and the migratory stratification of foreign nurses across generations’, explores the role of Catholic institutions in shaping Indian nurses’ mobility pathways to Italy. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global demand for nurses, and in many parts of the Global North (such as Europe, UK, Canada or the US) the provision of healthcare relies on the recruitment of  staff educated in the Global South. India represents one of the most important sources for this international recruitment of qualified nurses, who tend to be women from poorer groups.
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The international mobility of migrant nurses raises numerous challenges. When countries invest in the training of healthcare workers ‘for export’ – often at the expense of educational quality, workers’ rights and retention – this can make it difficult for their own country to address healthcare needs due to nurse shortages. In receiving countries, foreign-born nurses are often hired through temporary contracts; mass emergency recruitment coexists with periods of unemployment, resulting in precarious working conditions.

Blog post by Imran Awan and Damian Breen, Birmingham City University, UK
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March 23rd, 2025 marked five years since the first national lockdown in the UK as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As an unprecedented series of events, the pandemic exposed and exacerbated a range of pre-existing health and social inequalities, with Black and South Asian minority ethnic groups being among those most impacted.

At the height of the pandemic, the risk of mortality from COVID-19 was around three times higher for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups than the national average. Whilst this is far from a complete picture of Muslim communities in the UK, it is ordinarily as close as we get in terms of data pertaining to British Muslims where religion is not measured in publicly available national-level data. However, whilst there was some acknowledgement of the racialized disparities exposed by the pandemic, one aspect which was overlooked was the impact of lockdowns on faith communities.

As we show in our Identities article, ‘Islam and faith in times of crisis: religious observance and Muslim communities in the pandemic’, key focus of our research was ‘faith in times of crisis’, and specifically faith practice for Muslims in the context of local and national lockdowns. Our project drew attention to the emphasis on practise in the context of Islam, and what lockdowns and restrictions meant for Muslims in particular. 

Blog post by Sri Rahayu Hijrah Hati, University of Indonesia

In today’s fast-paced world, food delivery apps have become an essential part of urban life. With just a few taps on a smartphone, consumers can access a vast array of meals, delivered swiftly to their doorsteps. This convenience has been particularly significant in Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia, where online food platforms such as GrabFood and GoFood dominate the market. However, for Muslim consumers, convenience alone is not enough: ensuring that food adheres to halal standards is a fundamental requirement.

As the digital economy grows, so does the demand for ethical and religiously compliant food choices. This raises a critical question: how does religious self identity and halal labelling influence Muslim consumers’ trust and purchasing intentions in food delivery apps?

Our Identities article, ‘Food for the soul: religious identity and ethical halal labelling in sharing economy apps’, explores the complex relationship between religious identity, halal labelling, trust and trust in shaping consumer behaviour within Indonesia’s thriving digital marketplace.

Blog post by Rosa Martinez-Cuadros, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain and Alberta Giorgi, University of Bergamo, Italy
 
When considering ‘Islam’ and ‘feminism’ in Europe, people often think to the topics of migration, terrorism, and related narratives of women’s oppression within ‘Islam’ and opposition between ‘Islam’ and ‘Europe’. These narratives have been fuelled by the rise of far-right movements and Islamophobic discourses that associate ‘Islam’ with chauvinism, or male dominance. Additionally, European feminist movements are traditionally secular, with a long story of opposition to, and emancipation from, religion (Christian religion, more specifically): hence, religion, including Islam, is often primarily framed as a context of oppression for women.
 
This creates a complex environment for activist Muslim women living in Europe, especially those who aim to be engaged in civil society organizations and local politics. In this context, how do activist Muslim women respond to these challenges? Do they identify as feminists?

Blog post by Samira Azabar, University of Antwerp, Belgium and Radboud University, Netherlands

In public debates, Muslims in the West are often presented and perceived as the dangerous Other opposing democracy and Western values, situating them as outsiders to the nation. Consequently, Muslim minorities frequently find themselves grappling with multifaceted forms of marginalization and exclusion. This marginalization has been exacerbated by the success of radical right parties in the European countries, which often promote anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, further entrenching prejudice and exclusion. This blog post delves into the political endeavours of Muslims in Belgium, exploring how they navigate and resist their marginalization through everyday hidden resistance tactics aiming for recognition as co-members of the polity.

Understanding Muslims’ resistance
While research on Muslims’ political engagement often focuses on recognized forms of political participation such as voting and protests, my Identities article, ‘Good Muslims, good citizens? An intersectional approach to Muslims’ everyday (hidden) resistance tactics in Belgium’, pays special attention to more subtle forms of resistance enacted by Muslims in a society characterized by Islamophobia. To understand these forms of resistance, Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness is helpful in conceptualizing the duality experienced by marginalized groups, including where they view themselves through the eyes of the dominant group that discriminates against them. 

Blog post by Juliette Galonnier, Sciences Po Center for International Studies, France
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In July 2023, the alarming rise of public burnings of the Qur’an that occurred in several European countries, notably Sweden and Denmark, led the Human Rights Council of the United Nations to adopt a resolution on ‘countering religious hatred’. In hundreds of incidents, far-right or anti-Islam activists and politicians, sometimes under heavy police protection, had burned copies of the Holy Book in front of mosques or embassies of Muslim-majority countries.
 
These events garnered considerable international attention and received a number of responses (the Danish parliament subsequently adopted, in December 2023, a law that prohibits the ‘inappropriate treatment of writings with significant religious importance for a recognized religious community’). At the Human Rights Council, while incidents of Qur’an burning were unanimously condemned as despicable and wrong, there was no consensus as to how to characterize these events.

Blog post by Nasar Meer, University of Glasgow and co-Editor of Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power

One of the subplots emerging from the 2024 General Election is to be found in talk of the ‘Muslim vote’. This is said to have been mobilised against the Labour Party, in protest at its position on Gaza, in constituencies with a sizable Muslim electorate.  

The success of Independent candidates such as Shockat Adam, a local resident in Leicester South who overturned a 22,000 majority of the incumbent shadow cabinet member Jonathan Ashworth, certainly came as a surprise. While prevailing MRP  (multi-level regression and post stratification) models generally proved accurate in translating polling data into seat predictions, with some exceptions, they also reproduced a longstanding problem about the under polling of minority groups, which elsewhere missed that 23-year-old first time campaigner Leane Mohamed would in Ilford North come within 528 votes of unseating the new Health Secretary, Wes Streeting. 

Blog post by Fatima Rajina, De Montfort University, UK

When we think about Muslim clothing, often our immediate thoughts turn to Muslim women and their sartorial choices. Much of this has been framed via the media because of its incessant coverage, focusing on many European countries and their legislation monitoring Muslim women's clothing choices. This very discussion is in the press currently, as France has banned wearing the abaya in schools for young Muslim girls. It is precisely this framing that made me think about where Muslim men fit into this equation. How do Muslim men choose what they wear in public? What informs their decisions?
 
As a result, in my Identities article, 'British Muslim men and clothes: the role of stigma and the political (re)configurations around sartorial choices', I diverted from the fixation on Muslim women and interrogated the political imagination and (re)configuration of dress practices among British Bangladeshi Muslim men. I selected three attires, the lungi, the funjabi and the thobe, because of what they represent for Bangladeshis. The lungi and funjabi, although associated with Bangladeshis, carry different meanings in the diaspora than in Bangladesh. I explore how these two garments are worn in the UK and how they (re)appear in public. In contrast, the thobe projects an Islamic universalism not afforded to the first two garbs and carries a different form of visibility. I focus on how British Bangladeshis of varying age groups interact with different forms of attire and what it means for their identity negotiation in the public sphere.

Gender, as expressed on namely the bodies of Muslim women, is positioned at the centre of the radical right’s linkage between migration and religion. This link is visible in the persistent debates on the ban of Muslim body-covering, which in Austria has been promoted by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) since the turn of the century.
 
FPÖ’s debates on the ban of Muslim body-covering – of the headscarf in kindergartens and schools or of full body-covering in public spaces – which re-emerged since 2015, illustrate that the radical right instrumentalizes the intersection of gender, body and religion in its search for new forms of governing.
 
As I explore in my recently published Identities article, ‘Radical right populist debates on female Muslim body-coverings in Austria. Between biopolitics and necropolitics’, the radical right’s debates over female Muslim body-covering are embedded in the neoliberal reorganisation of societies and a crisis of governability, which radical right-wing actors use to implement their own biopolitical and necropolitical projects. 

Blog post by Ov Cristian Norocel Lund University, Sweden and Alberta Giorgi University of Bergamo, Italy

Blog post based on Identities' Special Issue, Disentangling Radical Right Populism, Gender, and Religion, Volume 29, No 4, August 2022.

​A broad and perhaps underappreciated feature of radical right populism is its simultaneous mobilization of cultural Christianity, on occasion combined with secularism, and women’s (and sometimes LGBT+) rights in a racializing, anti-immigration, and anti-Islamic discourse. Take for example the recent reaction in the USA of Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, who proclaimed on Twitter that ‘I am being attacked by the godless left because I said I’m a proud Christian Nationalist’ and added that she is even being called ‘a Nazi because I proudly love my country and my God’. By the same measure, in Italy, the League (La Lega) chairperson Matteo Salvini has previously maintained publicly his certainty that ‘Madonna will bring us the [political] victory’ and praised in religious conservative media the ‘traditional (heterosexual) family’. 

Concocted by the conservative quarters of the Vatican, the disparaging term 'gender ideology' has been taken up not only by the radical right, but also by some centre-left, liberal commentators, seemingly unconcerned with the concept's troublesome history. One notable example is the Economist's last year article denouncing the so-called 'trans ideology', titled A backlash against gender ideology is starting in universities. In my Identities article, 'Framing ‘gender ideology’: religious populism in the Croatian Catholic Church', I consider the provenance of how the 'gender ideology' frame was utilized by the Catholic church in Croatia – one of the earliest cases of widespread anti-gender mobilization in Europe.
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Having gone through a double transition to a capitalist liberal democracy, the revived religious nationalism in Croatia competed with liberal values from the 'free Western world'. The generous Vatican agreements signed in the late '90s by the authoritarian, right-wing government provided fertile ground for a blossoming of Catholic evangelization and proliferation of lay activism. In contrast to current research on the populist radical right which demonstrates the manipulation of religion committed by political actors, I identify factions of the Church itself as populist entrepreneurs. Polarizing populist discourse is traced back to Pope John Paul II's warnings against 'the war of the powerful against the weak', and connected to newer doctrinal, papal writings on issues of gender, ecology and politics.

Populist parties and leaders have become important actors across the globe. The 2022 presidential elections in France, and parliamentary elections in Sweden, as well as Turkey’s 2023 presidential elections not only revived academic research on populism and stirred scholarly debate about how to conceptualize it, but also compelled electors and political actors to reflect on the political developments taking place on the populist right front.
 
In our Identities article, ‘The veil as an object of right-wing populist politics: A comparative perspective of Turkey, Sweden, and France’, we selected three countries which have extremely different religious, secular, and cultural contexts. We then analyzed the political statements by the radical right-wing parties in each of the chosen countries: the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkey, the National Rally (Rassamblement National, NR) in France and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SDs) in Sweden. 

                                                                                                         - Donald Trump

​PRR’s LGBT stances
The statement from then-Presidential nominee Donald Trump followed the 2016 mass shooting at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Later, in 2020, Trump referred to himself as 'the most pro-gay President in America'. Simultaneously, he appointed overtly anti-LGBT candidates to judicial positions and oversaw various policies legitimizing the exclusion of LGBTQ+ people.

​Trump’s contradictory attitude towards LGBTQ+ minorities is emblematic of a broader Western trend in populist radical right (PRR) politics: PRR actors often adopt pro-LGBTQ+ stances whilst simultaneously propagating not only heteronormative family values and conservative religious moralities, but actively anti-LGBTQ+ policies.

The adamant defense of Christianity by far-right populists, as well as their ostensible display of Christian symbols such as the rosary, have been interpreted as hijacking religion from the hands of religious leaders and institutions. In fact, religious leaders have often accused far-right politicians of instrumentalizing religion for political gain, while far-right politicians have accused religious leaders of not defending Christianity against Islam. In a sense, far-right populist actors present themselves as being better interpreters and defenders of Christianity than religious leaders.
 
As many scholars have pointed out, the Christianity that far-right populism defends is a matter of culture and tradition imbricated in the historical past and national identity rather than a matter of faith. Thus, populists have been accused of not being ‘true believers’ and twisting religion to better serve their aims, and self-identified religious people who support far-right populism have been framed as victims of the political instrumentalization of religion. In my Identities article, ‘Hijack or release? On the heuristic limits of the frame of instrumentalization of religion for discussing the entanglements of populism, religion, and gender’, I explore the relationships between populism and religion from another angle, taking the transformations undertaken by religion and religiosity in contemporary societies into account.

In 2018, Romania organised a national referendum with the goal of defining in the Constitution that a family is composed of a man and a woman. Most of the parliamentary political parties openly supported the issue. The turnout failed to pass the 30% threshold needed for the referendum to be validated, but 93% of those who voted were in favour of this restrictive definition of family. It should be noted that the Romanian referendum was not an isolated case. Similar mobilisations around family and marriage issues have taken place throughout Central and Eastern Europe since the beginning of the 2010s (Croatia 2013, Slovakia 2015, or Slovenia 2015, for instance).
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In our Identities article, ‘No populism’s land? Religion and gender in Romanian politics’, we analysed the way parliamentarians used religious symbols and contents within their speeches during the debates for the 2018 referendum. We focused our research on the parliamentary debates covering the adoption of the referendum in Parliament (2012–2018) and the follow-up period (2018–2020) to analyse the ways political actors conceive and represent religion and gender in contemporary politics. 

On April 11, 2015, Pia Kjaersgaard, former leader of radical right populist Danish People’s Party concluded in her opinion piece: ‘We must dare to say that Christianity is better than Islam’. One year later, during the so-called burkini debate in France, Marine Le Pen, leader of radical right populist National Rally (formerly National Front), wrote in her blog: ‘This is the soul of France that is in question (…) France does not lock away a woman’s body, France does not hide half of its population under the fallacious and hateful pretext that the other half fears it will be tempted.’
 
These examples illustrate phenomena that have interested both academics and the public following the rise of radical right populist parties in the last couple of decades. More clearly, how are religion and gender featured in the rhetoric of such parties? These debates reveal two paradoxes. 

​As India hosted the World Environment Day celebrations in 2018, the prime minister, Narendra Modi, addressed the nation through his radio programme:

This is a very important achievement for India and it is also an acknowledgement as well as recognition of India's growing leadership in the direction of tackling climate change. This time, the theme is ‘Beat Plastic Pollution’. I appeal to all of you that while trying to understand the importance of this theme, we should all ensure that we do not use low-grade polythene and low-grade plastics and try to curb the negative impact of plastic pollution on our environment….Our culture, our traditions have never taught us to be at loggerheads with nature.

In his speech, India was projected as a leader in addressing climate change and a putative Indian culture was extolled as being effortlessly ecologically friendly. However, Modi’s claim of an environmentally-friendly Indian tradition is not supported by empirical evidence. For example, notions of civilisation in pre-colonial India– rather than preservation – of forests. Similarly, the intensification of traditional agriculture had detrimental ecological consequences even prior to the commercialisation of agriculture under colonial rule. Nevertheless, this claim of an ecologically sensitive Indian past is widely encountered – and promoted – in India and abroad.

​The rise of China is mostly perceived as an economic phenomenon. Yet, there is also the cultural dimension: What are the implications of Chinese leaders proclaiming that Chinese cultural traditions must be endorsed, as they essentially define what it means to be Chinese? The revival of popular religion in China, such as ancestral worship, which was suppressed over decades, but is now even applauded by President Xi Jinping as an expression of cherished core values of the Chinese, family and filial piety.

However, many phenomena related to religious practices in China defy conceptions of ‘religion’ developed in the light of Western historical patterns. Rituals are central in these phenomena, which can also be conceived as local customs and community traditions that express social norms and conceptions of social order without implicating ‘religion’. This ambiguity or even dissociation of ritual and religion is characteristic for East Asian societies and can be also observed in Japan, where ritual practices flourish, yet the majority of Japanese claim that they are ‘not religious’. Our Identities article, ‘Interaction ritual chains and religious economy: explorations on ritual in Shenzhen’, looks at these phenomena in the Shenzhen metropolis.

If we look at it sociologically, we see that blood has been associated with a spectrum of positive and negative qualities, from being a symbol of sacred bonds to outright impurity. Blood represents family ties, contains codes and data about our physical health and wellbeing, and is also pervasive in religious symbolism. The blood of a martyr or Messiah represents some truth about salvation, and the relation between humans and the divine.

My Identities article, ‘Could we use blood donation campaigns as social policy tools?: British Shi’i ritual of giving blood’, investigates the socio-cultural settings behind a nationwide blood donation campaign in the United Kingdom, the Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign – or in brief, IHBDC. The IHBDC was founded in Manchester by a few young Shia Muslim university students. Almost fourteen years after its foundation, IHBDC is one of the largest cross-ethnic blood donation campaigns collaborating with NHS Blood and Transplant, in England, as well as the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service (SNBTS). The community activists see this campaign as a way of honouring the sacrifice of their martyr and spiritual leader, Imam Hussain, as well as addressing a health-related social problem. As there is a difference in the frequency of blood types between different ethnic groups, in an increasingly multi-ethnic society, activists are needed to take on the responsibility of assisting with balancing the blood stock level at any given time. The conjunction of religious mythology of blood and donation activism has proved to be effective. Activists are getting more political recognition for their community, while contributing to tackling a social problem. The clearest mark of such recognition is the passing of motions supporting the campaign in both the London and Scottish Parliaments.

Du Bois’ work provides invaluable insights into the nature of reflexivity and self for the racialised 'other', which traditional, classic sociology has often overlooked. Whilst efforts to decolonise sociology continue, such as by including theorists such as Du Bois, there still has not been a sustained effort to dismantle and reconfigure an overwhelmingly white sociological canon still prevalent in European sociology (Meer 2019).

​In his seminal work, The Souls of Black Folk (1903 [2007]), Du Bois centres discussion of belonging, identity and self-awareness for racialised minorities through concepts of the ‘Veil’ and ‘double consciousness’. Du Bois’ analogy of the Veil is that of a racial barrier which is made of material in the divided experiences and inequality between the white majority and African-American minorities in the USA. For Du Bois, the Veil’s semi-transparency lends itself to the duality experienced by the racialised ‘other’: a double consciousness or a ‘two-ness’ which incorporates a ‘sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others’ (p.8).
 
In my Identities article, 'Examining BSA Muslim women’s everyday experiences of veiling through concepts of ‘the veil’ and ‘double consciousness’, the focus is on a reflective aspect of living behind the V/veil and the effects of double consciousness on gendered and racialised bodies. Here the capitalisation of the Veil is used to denote Du Bois’ descriptions of a divided world, whilst the non-capitalised use of veil (along with discussion on veiling, veiled) refers to the wearing of the hijab or niqab, as well as ways women discuss veiling practices.