|
|
Blog post by Karim Murji, University of West London, UK
My Identities article, ‘The BBC, public intellectuals, and the making of Five Views of Multiracial Britain’, centres on a series of five television programmes made by the BBC in 1978 and subsequently published as a slim booklet by the Commission for Racial Equality. This is a piece of media and socio-political history though re-viewing it in light of recent events reveals some notable contrasts about public intellectuals and the media/the BBC then and now. In August 2024 widespread rioting took place in towns and cities, largely in England though there were also some in Northern Ireland and in Wales. Some of the locations were Aldershot, Birmingham, Blackburn, Blackpool, Bolton, Bristol, Darlington, Hartlepool, High Wycombe, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester, Middlesbrough, Nottingham, Plymouth, Portsmouth, Preston, Rotherham, Southport, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland, Tamworth and Weymouth.
0 Comments
Blog post by Stephen Cho Suh, San Diego State University, USA
In April 2024, David Chang, head of the Momofuku food empire, came under fire when lawyers for his brand sent cease-and-desist letters to dozens of companies across the US. At issue was the apparent unauthorized use of ‘chili crunch’, a name that Momofuku was in the process of trademarking for one of its own chili oil products. Though Momofuku eventually pulled these requests, with Chang himself issuing a public apology, it was clear that a metaphorical line had been crossed. Chang, a long-time advocate if not key representative of the Asian American food scene, was roundly criticized by Asian American foodies and food entrepreneurs for doing the very things he frequently railed against – seemingly creating artificial barriers to entry for fledgling entrepreneurs while also policing the culinary boundaries of a dish or cuisine. To many, Chang had become the culinary bully that he had built his career claiming to despise. It is easy to dismiss this short-lived Asian American food drama as a business decision gone temporarily awry or as the grumblings of a small but loud minority. But doing so would miss the broader cultural significance of this micro-event. We contend that what was at conflict here was not simply the overly complicated nature of trademark law, nor was it just about who gets to claim ownership of an ingredient or dish. No, the predicament here had to do with something that was far more fundamental – the questions of ‘What is Asian American food?’ and ‘Who does Asian American food belong to?’. 
Blog post by Gabrielle Lindstrom, Mount Royal University, Canada
In general terms, diversity and cultural awareness training are approaches that fall under the auspices of equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI) initiatives. While there are different legal and political imperatives surrounding EDI discourses, diversity and cultural awareness education modalities are commonly used by many corporate, government and NGO (non-government organizations) to address gaps in knowledge with regard cultural realities other than mainstream Western perspectives. My Identities article, ‘Rethinking critical thinking, diversity and Indigenous awareness from a Blackfoot perspective’, is concerned with the Canadian settler context and is situated within conceptual terrain of EDI educational development. I offer a critique of the cadre of diversity initiatives that emerge out of EDI initiatives with emphasis on the Indigenous/cultural awareness training, unconscious bias training and culturally inclusive workplace approaches. These EDI methods distinct to Indigenous lived-experiences with Western colonialism are used to address information that was not taught in mainstream schools about Indigenous peoples historical and contemporary cultural realities. 
Blog post by Debra L. DeLaet, Drake University, USA
On February 6 each year, the United Nations observes the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). This observance aligns with anti-FGM initiatives within numerous UN agencies. Eradicating FGM by 2030 is a critical target of Sustainable Development Goal 5 focused on promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. In 2024, the theme of the International Day of Zero Tolerance for FGM was #HerVoiceMatters, described as an effort to elevate the voices of survivors in mobilizing support for global efforts to eliminate FGM. Despite the implied universality in campaigns such as #HerVoiceMatters, legal inconsistencies and cultural biases in global anti-FGM initiatives beg questions about whose voices – and whose bodies – matter in practice. According to the official website for the International Day of Zero Tolerance for FGM, FGM ‘comprises all procedures that involve altering or injuring the female genitalia for non-medical reasons…’ The simplicity of this definition, alongside the stated goal of zero tolerance, asserts a universal standard that seemingly should apply to women and girls across cultures. 
Blog post by Emaeyak Sylvanus, University of Nigeria, Nigeria
Historically, music has remained a critical unifying feature of the citizens in Nigeria's political processes, particularly during campaigns. Music has achieved this by transcending the many linguistic and ethnic barriers in modern Nigeria. The country’s February 2023 presidential election was no different with campaign songs as a medium through which political ideologies and identities were broadcast and reinforced. These memorable songs laden with cultural references served as a vehicle for political messaging that was both accessible and emotionally compelling. Our Identities article, ‘Music and political identity salience in Nigeria’s 2023 presidential election’, delves into this phenomenon by exploring how Nigerians used music to signal and express both their political affiliations and national identity. In the analysis, we posit that music has the power to amplify political identity salience, especially when it reflects deeper cultural and socio-political values. This was evident in the 2023 presidential elections, where the campaign songs not only supported political candidates but also conveyed messages of hope, unity, and, at times, dissent. 
Blog post by Neal A. Lester and Elizabeth McNeil
In the technicolorized version of the film Imitation of Life (1959) about racial passing and white supremacy, Annie Johnson, a Black housekeeper, asks a rhetorical and existential question of Miss Lora Meredith, Annie’s white employer and mother of a white daughter. Referring to her Black daughter Sarah Jane, who passes for white, Ms. Johnson says, ‘How do you tell a child that she was born to be hurt?’ While this film is melodrama at its best, Annie's sentiment captures Black parenting and Black guardianship and its inability to protect Black children and families from systemic racism. It further underscores the fact that adult racial politics deny Black children their humanity and the luxuries and privileges granted white children and white childhood. Whether through the adultification of Black children or the erasure of Black children’s experiences altogether, representational and physical violence against Black children in cartoons, commercial ads, games and picture books mirrors manifestations of racial violence against Black adults. Such racialized physical and representational violence denies humanity to Black people more broadly, adults and children alike. Within the contexts of US history, children's literature and popular culture, the invisibilization of Black children is yet another social injustice under the colonial white gaze. This invisibility includes the exploitation of Black children in poverty porn as well as Black children’s experiences with ‘curriculum violence’ in problematic classroom pedagogies across the USA. 
Blog post by Rebecca Callahan, University of Vermont, USA; Julieta Rico, University of California at Los Angeles, USA; Kathryn M. Obenchain, Purdue University, USA; Claudia Ochoa, University of Texas-Austin, USA; and Angeles De Santos-Quezada, University of Texas-Austin, USA
Polarizing and hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric dominates political news in the US, a nation uniquely defined by both its immigrant origins and its racist, white settler colonial history. In the politically charged months leading up to the 2020 election, we interviewed dozens of Latiné young adult US citizens about their sense of belonging and responsibility to their community. As we explore in our Identities article, ‘Civic identity: media, belonging, and Latiné youth in the 2020 US presidential election’, these data revealed surprising findings; (1) our participants used social media to identify a community of belonging beyond their geographic locale; (2) as informed citizens, they curated, vetted and disseminated information to protect and improve the community; and (3) they perceived media misinformation as a serious threat to democracy. Not only did participants report using social media to identify a community of belonging defined by shared experiences, beliefs or ethnicity, but they did so at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic limited traditional ways that people gathered and engaged in civic life. Social media allowed participants to connect not only with family and friends, but also with a large coethnic community that expanded beyond their physical location to include people they already knew as well as those they admired (e.g., celebrities and political figures). 
Blog post by Meghan Tinsley, University of Manchester, UK; Sadia Habib, University of Manchester, UK; Chloe Peacock, University of Sheffield, UK; Ruth Ramsden-Karelse, Institute for Cultural Inquiry, Germany; and Gary Younge, University of Manchester, UK
Toppling a monumental, public statue may be powerful, cathartic, or even jarring for those who witness it. As sites of memory and public art, statues are imposing, apparently permanent figures that claim a prominent place in both urban space and collective memory. Toppling these statues overthrows the appearance of stability and authority. It is at least partly because this act was so visually striking that images of cultural activists toppling statues were among the most iconic symbols of the Black Lives Matter protests that erupted across the globe in the summer of 2020. Far less public attention, however, has focused on what has happened to public space since the statues were toppled. Certainly, dethroning slavers and colonisers is an important first step of decolonising history, but it also introduces the question of who, or what, should replace their stories and voices. Similarly, toppling statues of slavers and colonisers in 2020 signalled the beginning of an equally fraught – and ongoing – debate over what to do with newly emptied pedestals and public squares. 
Blog post by Samira Azabar, University of Antwerp, Belgium and Radboud University, Netherlands
In public debates, Muslims in the West are often presented and perceived as the dangerous Other opposing democracy and Western values, situating them as outsiders to the nation. Consequently, Muslim minorities frequently find themselves grappling with multifaceted forms of marginalization and exclusion. This marginalization has been exacerbated by the success of radical right parties in the European countries, which often promote anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, further entrenching prejudice and exclusion. This blog post delves into the political endeavours of Muslims in Belgium, exploring how they navigate and resist their marginalization through everyday hidden resistance tactics aiming for recognition as co-members of the polity. Understanding Muslims’ resistance While research on Muslims’ political engagement often focuses on recognized forms of political participation such as voting and protests, my Identities article, ‘Good Muslims, good citizens? An intersectional approach to Muslims’ everyday (hidden) resistance tactics in Belgium’, pays special attention to more subtle forms of resistance enacted by Muslims in a society characterized by Islamophobia. To understand these forms of resistance, Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness is helpful in conceptualizing the duality experienced by marginalized groups, including where they view themselves through the eyes of the dominant group that discriminates against them. 
Blog post by Lambros Fatsis, City, University of London, UK. Cross-posted from The BSC Blog.
“Riots Engulf Britain”, “Under Siege”, “Summer of Discontent”, “You Will Regret This, Starmer Warns Rioters”, “Rioting Thugs Must Not Be Allowed to Win”. This is how the violence that recently broke out in multiple cities across England became headline news. What kind of violence was this though? Is any of it new? Is more policing the answer? These are some of the questions that have circulated widely in the aftermath of those events, especially in the Twittersphere. A closer look at them, therefore, seems appropriate—as an attempt to go beyond sensationalist reporting and irresponsible punditry that traffics in info-wars, but does not really aid our understanding of the historical, ideological, political and socio-cultural dimensions of such ‘rioting’. 
Blog post by Andrea Calabretta, University of Padua, Italy; Francesco Della Puppa, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy; and Giulia Storato, University of Padua, Italy
‘It is this fact of locomotion, as I have said, that defines the very nature of society’: this is what sociologist Robert Park[1] said exactly a century ago, seeing mobility as the characteristic and founding feature of humanity. It is no coincidence that the book in which he makes these considerations is titled ‘the City’ and brings together a set of essays on urban life. If people move naturally, at some point they also need to come to the – provisional – end of their journeys. To stop, at least for a moment, and to take root. How then do migrants settle in cities and territories that are already inhabited? How do they develop relationships with the previous inhabitants? And with the future migrants, who will arrive after them? These questions have permeated the sociology of migration and urban sociology for over a hundred years. Our Identities article, ‘The migratory crossroads of Alte Ceccato: an emblematic case of migratory stratification’, attempts to analyze these questions from a new perspective. While migration studies have kept the ‘camera’ fixed on migrants and their complex movements, we focus on a specific place – the hamlet of Alte Ceccato in Italy – in order to observe the stratification and interaction between different ages of migration. 
Blog post by Juliette Galonnier, Sciences Po Center for International Studies, France
In July 2023, the alarming rise of public burnings of the Qur’an that occurred in several European countries, notably Sweden and Denmark, led the Human Rights Council of the United Nations to adopt a resolution on ‘countering religious hatred’. In hundreds of incidents, far-right or anti-Islam activists and politicians, sometimes under heavy police protection, had burned copies of the Holy Book in front of mosques or embassies of Muslim-majority countries. These events garnered considerable international attention and received a number of responses (the Danish parliament subsequently adopted, in December 2023, a law that prohibits the ‘inappropriate treatment of writings with significant religious importance for a recognized religious community’). At the Human Rights Council, while incidents of Qur’an burning were unanimously condemned as despicable and wrong, there was no consensus as to how to characterize these events. 
Blog post by Rozemarijn Weyers, KU Leuven and University of Antwerp, Belgium
On the 22nd of November 2023, the party of far-right politician Geert Wilders was elected the largest in the Netherlands. His statement that 'the Netherlands will be returned to the Dutch' alludes to the question of who is considered Dutch and who is not, and what the role of whiteness is in the construction of Dutch identity? In my research, I look at such questions in the context of urban neighbourhood spaces. More specifically, I research how a distinction between 'us' and 'them', and more specifically, white Dutch identity and racialized otherness, are created through daily interactions in such spaces? The case of Geert Wilders is only one example of how the relationship between whiteness and national identity is marked out. In the context of Europe, several studies show other ways of how national identities are entangled with, and shaped by, notions of race (see for instance Beaman 2019; Muller 2011; Clarke 2023; Garner 2012; Cretton 2018). What those studies have in common is that they argue that those national identities often exist in contexts that claim to be colour-blind and perceive whiteness as the norm. 
Blog post by Shereen Fernandez, London School of Economics, UK
Right now in the UK, the topic of ‘extremism’ is once again gripping public consciousness. On 14th March 2024, Michael Gove MP, the communities secretary, unveiled a new government definition of extremism, which is: ‘the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance, that aims to:
The unveiling of this new definition of extremism aims to target groups and individuals who, if defined as an extremist, will be blocked from engaging in government, working in public bodies, and receiving council grants. Extremists are not considered as lawless per se, meaning that they cannot be prosecuted but instead, are considered to be ‘unacceptable’ by government. Of course, any designation of extremism will have a direct impact on how such groups and individuals can operate in other spaces of significance, such as in religious institutions, where claims of hosting ‘extremists’ will set them back significantly. As shown in my Identities article on Prevent in schools, ‘When counter-extremism ‘sticks’: the circulation of the Prevent Duty in the school space’, the label of ‘extremism’, for Muslims especially, is part of a long trajectory dating back to 9/11 which saw their significant securitization globally as a result of labels like this. 
Blog post by Leoni Connah, Flinders University, Australia
Kashmiri solidarity with Palestine and the ongoing situation in Gaza is currently being silenced by Narendra Modi’s BJP. For decades, the ongoing resistance between Kashmiri civilians and Indian security forces in the Kashmir Valley (particularly Srinagar) has drawn inspiration from the Palestinian struggle (particularly in Gaza) and the two situations have often been compared and contrasted. However, since October 2023, the solidarity that Kashmiris have towards Palestine and the ways in which it is expressed has changed because of the clamping down of Modi’s BJP and his security forces. This short piece provides insight into two aspects of Kashmiri solidarity with Palestine. Firstly, it looks at why Kashmiris are willing to risk their own safety to stand in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Secondly, it explores exactly what this solidarity looks like and examines how Kashmiris are finding alternative ways to resist such silencing that may not be through street demonstrations, but instead using the mediums of art and poetry. The piece considers the following questions: why do Kashmiris stand in solidarity with Palestine? What are the consequences that Kashmiris face through this solidarity? Why does Modi silence Kashmiris when it comes to Palestine? 
Blog post by Fraser McQueen, University of Bristol, UK
Anxieties were running high on Sunday as French voters went to the polls in the second round of this year's legislative elections. At a time of rising support for the far right across Europe – and with France's current centrist administration having already passed hard-line anti-Muslim and anti-migrant policies – most observers believed that the far-right National Rally (RN) would emerge as the nation's strongest party. An overall majority seemed unlikely, but possible. The eventual result was very different: a shock victory for the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP). The RN and its allies finished third, with the 'centrist bloc' composed of President Emmanuel Macron's party and its allies coming in second. The far right was kept out through a resuscitation of what was historically labelled a 'Republican front'. As the second round of voting approached, an unprecedentedly high number of three-way contests in various constituencies looked likely. Many (although not all) candidates from either the left or centrist blocs therefore stood down, asking their first-round supporters to support an opponent better placed to beat the RN. 
Blog post by Nasar Meer, University of Glasgow and co-Editor of Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power
One of the subplots emerging from the 2024 General Election is to be found in talk of the ‘Muslim vote’. This is said to have been mobilised against the Labour Party, in protest at its position on Gaza, in constituencies with a sizable Muslim electorate. The success of Independent candidates such as Shockat Adam, a local resident in Leicester South who overturned a 22,000 majority of the incumbent shadow cabinet member Jonathan Ashworth, certainly came as a surprise. While prevailing MRP (multi-level regression and post stratification) models generally proved accurate in translating polling data into seat predictions, with some exceptions, they also reproduced a longstanding problem about the under polling of minority groups, which elsewhere missed that 23-year-old first time campaigner Leane Mohamed would in Ilford North come within 528 votes of unseating the new Health Secretary, Wes Streeting. 
Blog post by Aino Korvensyrjä, University of Helsinki
In the first week of May 2018, there was some moral panic in the German media. National and regional media reported on a ‘mob’ of 150–200 black Africans violently stopping deportation and attacking the enforcement patrol in a reception centre for asylum seekers in Ellwangen, Baden-Württemberg. After the 2015 ‘Summer of Migration’, when popular sympathies for refugee-migrants had peaked in Germany, such narratives of dangerous black and brown refugee-migrant men were a standard feature in the German media and public debate. This continuous panic created public acceptance of deportations of asylum seekers and the increasingly ruthless control policies at external EU borders. My Identities article, ‘Criminalizing black solidarity: Dublin deportations, raids, and racial statecraft in southern Germany’, looks beyond the media and policy debate on ‘Ellwangen’. It examines how the police and courts managed local conflicts over deportation during an intense campaign to increase so-called Dublin deportations. These are deportations to the first country of entry in Europe. For the authorities, a fingerprint registered into the EURODAC database by another European country is enough to begin the deportation proceedings. West Africans were then a key target group of Dublin deportations, and Italy was the main country of destination. The article draws attention to a series of police raids targeting West African migrants living in southern German asylum camps in 2018, including the above-mentioned raid in Ellwangen. In all cases, police accused West African men of rioting against deportation enforcement to Italy, and local courts prosecuted numerous individuals. My article explores how the police and local courts thus suppressed anti-deportation protests and how their practices produced race. 
Blog post by Christian Lamour, Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, Luxembourg
Late modernity in the European Union is characterized by the return of ‘hot nationalism’, with a growing number of citizens supporting radical right parties and leaders. These political entities and personnel have hammered out an electoral winning, ‘nation-first’ agenda, which is notably marketed as protecting the cultural identity and cohesion of a national people, jeopardized by alien threats. This vivid return of national cultural identities in the agenda of European states has appeared at a time when relationships between EU member states have been remarkably peaceful for generations, whereas their main long-term heritage has been the reproduction of national conflicts, territorial gains and momentary stabilization of borders following treaties torn apart in subsequent wars. The cultural enemies defined by today’s EU radical right within specific nation states are not neighbouring nations, but communities, the identities of which are represented as external to the world of nations. This means the elites are characterized as Europeanized/globalized, whilst the non-European migrants are racialized as oriental/African entities replacing the European national identities with the support of the globalized elite. 
Blog post by Siow-Kian Tan, Xiamen University, Malaysia
Food has the incredible ability to bring people together, yet it can also stir up debates over its origins. Dishes like Laksa, Nasi Lemak, Bak Kut Teh (BKT), Hainanese Chicken Rice and other local favourites have been passionately claimed as national dishes by both Malaysians and Singaporeans. This culinary dispute isn’t new. Back to 2009, Malaysia’s then-tourism minister, Ng Yen Yen, sparked controversy and patriotic fervour in both neighbouring countries by suggesting that Malaysian cuisine had been ‘hijacked’ by others. Each side adamantly defends dishes like nasi lemak, BKT and chilli crab as authentic and original, and criticizing the other of appropriating culinary heritage. However, are such disputes meaningful and can a dish genuinely belong to a single nation? In 2023, Channel News Asia’s ‘On The Red Dot’ programme delved into these questions, interviewing chefs, hawkers and heritage experts to uncover the origins and stories behind iconic dishes like chili crab, BKT, nasi lemak and cendol. Hosted by Ming Tan, a chef and culinary consultant, this captivating series explores how dishes evolve and travel across borders. 
Blog post by Revital Madar, European University Institute, Italy
At the time of writing this text, more than 30,000 Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli army in Gaza since Hamas attacked the south of Israel on October 7, 2023. It’s a number that one cannot really grasp. Yet, it is a number that spreads terror. Especially when it indicates that this number includes the killing of more than 12,000 children and that, as terrible as these numbers are, they do not include those who were buried under the rubble and people who died because they didn’t have access to medical care and simple essential nutrition and drinking water. Yet, according to a poll conducted in the middle of January this year, 51% of Israeli Jews consider the Israeli army to be using an appropriate amount of force in Gaza. Another 43% consider the current attack on Gaza not enough, force-wise. A more recent poll (February 12-15, 2024) found that nearly 70% of Jewish Israelis do not support transferring humanitarian aid to Gaza, even if this aid is transferred by international bodies that are not related to Hamas or UNRWA. 
Blog post by Anne-Iris Romens, University of Milan-Bicocca, Italy, and Francesca Vianello, University of Padua, Italy
In the context of the hardening of the political discourse, skilled migrations are presented as one of the few remaining acceptable ways of entering European countries. A recent example is the parliamentary debate in France regarding the adoption of the increasingly restrictive law on immigration, which further limits access to residence permits and social rights. Despite this rhetoric, the knowledge and skills of migrants are rarely valued in the job market. Migrants are mainly forced to accept jobs which enjoy little social recognition. Migrant women, in particular, tend to be confined to low-pay jobs in the care sector, including when they hold university degrees. These examples illustrate the ambiguity of the concept of ‘skills’. The notion works as a social marker according to which some bodies are marked as skilled, and others as unskilled, with class, racialization and gender having a significant impact. In this field, recruiters have a key role in defining whose abilities are to be compensated and whose are to be hidden. 
Blog post by Ece Yoltay, Ahi Evran University, Turkey
My Identities article, ‘Queering trialectics among space, power, and the subject: spatial representations and practices of othered identities in Turkey’, is grounded in a critical analysis of the Foucaldian conceptualization of the relation between power and the subject. It does so by examining the construction of the concept of ‘supra-identity’ with the Repressive and Ideological State Apparatus in Turkey. Since the Republic of Turkey was established as a nation-state in a predominantly Muslim society, various legal and social regulations determining state-citizen relationships have been shaped in its political history (single-party period 1923-1946, multi-party period 1946-2018, Presidential system 2018-present). While each government in this history produces its own political interpretation of the 'ideal' citizen, the emphasis on Turkish and Muslim identities, particularly within the heteronormative social structure associated with Islam, has been common value for defining ‘supra-identity’. In Turkey's multicultural society, homogenizing differences over these identity values of the 'majority' has been deemed necessary for the 'unity of the state'. 
Blog post by Ioana Vrabiescu, Vrije University Amsterdam, Netherlands
In my Identities article, ‘Detention is morally exhausting’: melancholia of detention centres in France’, I invite the reader to reflect on two main issues: the perceived role of the law and the legal system and how these perceptions are translated into the organization of migration control. The perception of the law as fundamental to the state practices allows people to continue working alongside the migration control apparatus despite their beliefs that the law is not perfect. The tension in this context lies in the interplay between the perceived fundamental role of the law in the functioning of the state and individual beliefs about a deficient legal system. Despite these beliefs, individuals continue to work in the migration control apparatus based on their understanding of the law's fundamental importance. Within the migration control apparatus, I chose migrant detention centres as those sites that best reflect these ethical frictions, resulting in an atmosphere of melancholia. 
Blog post by Jakub Gortat, University of Lodz, Poland
German–Austrian relations and specifics of Austrian national identity appear to substantiate the assumption that the world-systems theory and centre-periphery model, elaborated on by scholars decades ago, are still applicable. Austria has often defined itself in opposition to Germany: since the end of the Second World War, Austria has taken pride in being a nation separate and distinct from Germany. This can be seen in the political declarations of the leading politicians and the narrative of the leading political parties throughout this period. To a large extent, this conviction was based on some recognizable national stereotypes and myths presenting Austria as a peaceful country with a splendid tradition and picturesque Alpine landscapes that had nothing to do with National Socialism, void of any responsibility for the crimes against Jews and other ethnic or national minorities committed under it or the war itself, which in the light of historical research undertook many years later turned out to be simply mendacious. On the other hand, the self-stereotype of an independent, cultural nation paradoxically reduced the perception of Austria abroad (including Germany) to catchy clichés about Mozart, the Habsburgs and the Viennese waltz. |
Explore Identities at tandfonline.com/GIDE |
Bluesky: @identitiesjournal.bsky.social
|
The views and opinions expressed on The Identities Blog are solely those of the original blog post authors, and not of the journal, Taylor & Francis Group or the University of Glasgow.